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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
FEDERAL WILDLIFE STATUTES: A NEW
RULE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The number of legal measures designed to protect wildlife1 and other
living resources2 has multiplied sharply in recent years.3 More than one
hundred federal statutes, regulations, executive orders, treaties, and interna-
tional agreements now comprise this area of the law.4 Yet despite this array
of legal provisions, the actual protection afforded wildlife and other living
resources is less than complete. Treaty prohibitions against the taking5 of
protected wildlife usually cannot be enforced directly against American cit-
izens in U.S. courts. 6 And although federal wildlife legislation is enforcea-
1. Federal wildlife conservation statutes are compiled in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, A COMPILATION OF FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO CONSERVATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF OUR NATION'S FISH AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, AND
OCEANOGRAPHY (1977). Wildlife law includes a wide range of statutes and regulations
designed to create wildlife habitats and to prohibit the taking, export and import of protected
wildlife species. "Quite simply, if all the federal laws which have or might have some direct or
indirect impact on the tangled bank of life are included under the umbrella of 'wildlife law,'
then one can hardly exclude any law." ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 3 (1977). This Note considers only those federal wildlife statutes
that provide penalties for the taking of wildlife and its import and export.
2. A summary reprinting of U.S. treaties dealing with wildlife conservation appears in
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
ON FISHERIES, OCEANOGRAPHIC RESOURCES, AND WILDLIFE INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES
(1977).
3. For a description of the growth of federal and international wildlife law, see THE
EVOLTrrION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 1, at 4-5. See also Coggins & Smith,
The Emerging Law of Wildltfe:,A Narrative Bibliography, 6 ENVT"L L. 583, 583-84, 618 (1975).
4. THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 1, at Preface.
5. "Taking" is a term of art used in federal wildlife conservation law to mean anything
from harassing to killing wildlife. See, ag., Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1362(13) (1976) [hereinafter cited as MMPA] (defining "take" as to "harass, hunt, capture, or
kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal").
6. Most wildlife treaties to which the United States is a party are not self-executing.
Congress must pass legislation implementing their provisions before they become binding on
American citizens. See note 43 infra and accompanying text. An example of a non-self-
executing treaty is the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, United
States-Great Britain, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628. Attempts by individuals to enforce the Con-
vention's prohibitions in court have failed. See National Audubon Soe'y, Inc. v. Johnson, 317
F. Supp. 1330, 1334-35 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Berberian v. Avery, 99 R.I. 77, 205 A.2d 579 (1964);
cf. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (non-self-executing U.N. resolu-
tions do not confer judicially enforceable rights on individual citizens). But see United States
v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 276-79 (2d Cir. 1974) (enforcement of defendant's rights granted,
inter alia, by treaties).
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ble against American citizens within the United States, 7 federal courts have
not applied these statutes extraterritorially. Specifically, in United States v.
Mitchell, 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused
to apply the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 19729 to an American na-
tional who had taken dolphins in Bahamian territorial waters.10 The court
based its decision on the traditional presumption that federal laws apply
only within U.S. territory, absent a clear expression of congressional intent
to the contrary.'1
Two familiar means exist by which enforcement officials could sur-
mount these barriers to effective control of the taking of protected wildlife
by American nationals outside U.S. territorial limits. Congress could
amend existing federal wildlife conservation laws so as clearly to express an
intent that the statutes apply extraterritorially. Alternatively, the United
States could, as a matter of foreign policy, encourage foreign nations to
enact legislation prohibiting the taking of certain wildlife.12 This Note will
propose yet a third method of control: the use by the federal courts of an
expanded rule of statutory interpretation that would increase the extraterri-
torial applications of federal wildlife conservation law in specific cases. Ex-
plication of this modified rule requires an examination of existing methods
for regulating the activities of U.S. citizens abroad that are harmful to wild-
life. This will include a review of international trends in wildlife conserva-
tion and current views on extraterritoriality, as well as a brief description of
U.S. wildlife law. The Note will then describe the modified rule and dis-
cuss how it would operate, particularly as applied to the situation presented
in United States v. Mitchell. ' 3
I
MECHANISMS FOR WILDLIFE PROTECTION
A. INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATION LAW
In the past decade, several major developments in public international
law have contributed to an evolving customary international law of wildlife
protection. For example, the international community has increasingly rec-
7. See, eg., United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 198 (1975).
8. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
9. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976).
10. 553 F.2d at 997.
11. 553 F.2d at 1002; see notes 35-37 infra and accompanying text.
12. This policy is already clearly enunciated in a number of federal wildlife conservation
statutes. See, e.g., MMPA, supra note 5, § 1378(a)(1) (the Secretary of the Interior shall "initi-
ate negotiations" for the "development of bilateral or multilateral agreements with other na-
tions for the protection and conservation of all marine mammls"); Endangered Species of Fish
and Wildlife Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1537(b)(1) (1976) (the Secretary of the Interior shall "encourage
foreign countries to provide for the conservation of fish or wildlife").
13. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
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ognized that wildlife is a "public trust" 14 and "the common heritage of
mankind,"15 and many nations have signed regional wildlife conventions.16
Probably the most significant developments in the field are the Principles of
the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 17 and the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,' 8 both of which attempt
to state basic international wildlife conservation principles and to codify
those principles in treaty form.
Some of the draftsmen of the Stockholm Declaration saw it as a "first
step toward the development of international environmental law." 19 The
Declaration gives sovereign states responsibility for preserving the world's
wildlife2 ° and may even impose an obligation on states to prevent their
nationals from acting in ways that harm wildlife, no matter where the ac-
tions occur.21 Similarly, the Informal Composite Negotiating Text of the
Sixth Session of the Law of the Sea Conference appears to envision the
eventual extraterritorial application of domestic wildlife law.22 Yet both of
these developments are only preliminary steps that cannot either alone or in
tandem fulfill the task of protecting wildlife on an international scale.
B. UNITED STATES CONSERVATION LAW AND ITS
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
1. Statutory Protection of Wildlife
The federal courts have long recognized the power of Congress to give
14. Nanda & Ris, The Public Trust Doctrin. A Viable Approach to International Environ-
mental Protection, 5 ECOL. L.Q. 291, 307-13 (1976).
15. G.A. Res. 2749,25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (declar-
ing that "It]he sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction... as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind");
see Arnold, The Common Heritage of Mankind as a Legal Concept, 9 INT'L LAW. 153 (1975);
Myers, The Cheetah in Africa under Threat, 5 ENVT'L AFF. 617, 634-35 (1976).
16. See, eg., Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western
Hemisphere, done Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Star. 1354, T.S. No. 981, U.N.T.S. 193. For an analysis of
the Convention, see THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW, supra note I, at 313-18.
17. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Negoti-
ating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Negotiating Text], re-
printed in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATEmALS 1108 (1977). Of particular relevence are arts. 55-75
(Exclusive Economic Zone) and arts. 116-120 (Management and conservation of the living
resources of the high seas).
18. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Declaration], re-
printed in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1416 (1972).
19. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J.
423, 431 (1973).
20. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 18, principles 4, 7, 13, 17.
21. Sohn, supra note 19, at 492-93.
22. Article 117 of the Negotiating Text states: "All States have the duty to adopt, or to co-
operate with other States in adopting, such measures for their respective nationals as may be
necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas." Negotiating Text,
supra note 17.
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a statute extraterritorial effect, based on any one of four theories ofjurisdic-
tion: territorial,23 protective, 24 universality,2 5 and nationality.26 The terri-
torial, protective, and universality principles do not appear to justify the
extraterritorial application of federal wildlife conservation law. They re-
quire that the regulated conduct produce or be intended to produce adverse
effects within American territory,27 on U.S. governmental functions or se-
curity,28 or on some other universally accepted state interest such as the
23. The territorial principle can be broken down into "subjective" and "objective" territo-
riality. The Restatement defines subjective territoriality as follows:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether
or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the
territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its territory.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 17 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as REsTATEmENT]. Objective territoriality, by contrast, means that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if
either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a
crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule
applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsis-
tent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably
developed legal systems.
Id. § 18.
24. A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as a state or the operation of its
governmental functions, provided the conduct is generally recognized as a crime
under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
Id. § 33(1).
25. "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law with respect to piracy.. . ... Id. §
34.
26. "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law (a) attaching legal consequences to
conduct of a national... wherever the conduct occurs. .. ." Id. § 30(l)(a).
27. See note 23 supra. "Unlawful effects in this ountry.. . are often decisive ...
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952).
28. See note 24 suvra United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922); United States v.
Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1967); United States v. Rodri-
guez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), re,'d on other grounds sub. nom. Rocha v. United
States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708,709-10 (S.D. Cal.
1943).
The Rodriguez court also distinguished between the protective principle and the objective
territorial principle:
Acts committed outside the territorial limits of the State but intended to produce,
or producing, effects within the boundaries of the State are subject to penal sanctions
.... Where the effect is felt by private persons within the State, penal sanctions rest
on the "objective," or "subjective," territorial principle .... Where the effect of the
acts committed outside the United States is felt by the government, the protective the-
ory affords the basis by which the state is empowered to punish all those offenses
which impinge upon its sovereignty, wherever these actions take place and by whom-
ever they may be committed.
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prevention of piracy.29 It is difficult to establish that the taking of wildlife
produces any of these effects.30
The nationality basis ofjurisdiction, by contrast, may permit the extra-
territorial application of federal wildlife conservation law, because it estab-
lishes the right of Congress to attach legal consequences to the conduct of
U.S. nationals wherever the conduct occurs.31 For example, Congress can
prohibit the taking of blue whales by American nationals, even in the wa-
ters of another nation. Yet even under the nationality principle, there are
limits on extraterritorial enforcement, as opposed to extraterritorial pre-
scription, of federal wildlife conservation laws.3 2
182 F. Supp. at 488 (citations and footnote omitted).
29. For a discussion of other possible universal crimes, including slavery, see RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 23, Reporter's Note 2.
30. But see Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), U.S. DE,'T OF STATE,
ARBITRATION SERIES No. 8, [1949] 3 R. Int'l Ab. Awards 1905 (1941). In that case, the tribu-
nal held Canada responsible to the United States under international law for the production in
Canada of fumes that polluted the air in the United States. The Trail Smelter decision could
provide precedent for the use of the objective territoriality principle in federal wildlife conser-
vation law, if plaintiff could show that pollution created outside the United States has a delete-
rious effect on wildlife habitats. International law may evolve to the point where the taking of
certain endangered species anywhere is considered a universal crime against humanity. A
short analysis of the present extraterritorial application of environmental law appears in Note,
Extraterritoral Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 1005, 1022-24 (1976).
31. See note 26 supra. The nationality principle is universally accepted, although there
are striking differences in the extent to which it is used in the different national systems. The
United States rarely applies its laws extraterritorially solely on the basis of the nationality
principle.
Indeed, it is hard for an Anglo-American lawyer to conceive of situations requiring
application of our law to a national who, entirely apart from commerce between the
United States and the foreign country in which he for the moment is transacting busi-
ness and entirely apart from any effect upon or activity within the United States, acts
in a way which, if he acted in the United States, would violate our law.
Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in DVming the International Reach of-4merican Regu-
latory Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. LJ. 586, 604 (1961). In some instances, however, the United
States does exercise jurisdiction based solely on nationality. See Kawakita v. United States,
343 U.S. 717 (1952); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1976) (treason "within the United States or elsewhere"
is a criminal offense). But see American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356
(1909). Civil law countries have been more willing to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction solely
on the basis of nationality, particularly with regard to their penal codes. See Research in
International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 522-23 (Supp.
1935). The analogy to both U.S. and foreign law thus justifies American exercise of nationality
jurisdiction, either through legislative enactment or through judicial interpretation, with re-
gard to the penal provisions of a limited group of statutes.
32. The distinction between enforcement jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdiction is im-
portant. Under international law, enforcement jurisdiction depends, first, on prescriptive juris-
diction and, second, on the presence of either the defendant or his property within the territory
of the forum. See N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM,
139-51 (1973). After the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977),
quasi in rem jurisdiction may be a less effective enforcement mechanism.
For a discussion of some of the problems inherent in the enforcement of a law permitting
extraterritorial application, including service of the defendant, investigation of the circum-
19791
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In deciding whether to apply a particular statute extraterritorially, fed-
eral courts have generally looked to congressional intent, 33 which they have
ascertained by using the traditional tools of statutory interpretation. 34 The
starting point for such interpretation is the rebuttable presumption that stat-
utes only apply to conduct that occurs within or has an effect within U.S.
territory, unless Congress clearly indicates a contrary intent35 either in the
statute's language36 or in its legislative history.3
7
In some instances, courts have extraterritorially applied a statute that
contains no explicit provision in favor of or in opposition to such applica-
tion, in order effectively to carry out the congressional purpose in enacting
the statute.38 But no court has adopted this "nature of the law" analysis for
a federal wildlife conservation statute.3 9 In general, under present case law,
only those federal wildlife conservation statutes that clearly call for extra-
territorial application comprehend the conduct of American nationals act-
ing in foreign territories.
stances of the alleged illegal conduct, possible double jeopardy problems, and principles of
international comity, see AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN PAYMENTS, N.Y. BAR ASS'N, RE-
PORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS BY CORPORATIONS: THE PROBLEM AND AP-
PROACHS TO A SOLUTION (Mar. 14, 1977). See also American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
33. See, eg., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949) (court must look to con-
gressional intent to determine if federal labor laws regulating maximum work hours apply to
contract between the United States and a private contractor); Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
34. The wide range of sources available, including statutory language, legislative history,
and administrative interpretations is amply demonstrated by the decision in Foley Bros. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285-88 (1949). See Moore v. Robinson, 206 Ga. 27, 40, 55 S.E.2d 711,
720 (1949) ("interpretation is a matter addressed solely to the intelligence, information, and
learning of the judge, and he is not restricted as to the means by which he may enlarge these
faculties").
35. "All legislation is primafacie territorial." American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). See also note 11 supra.
36. "Rules of United States statutory law, whether prescribed by federal or state authority,
apply only to conduct occurring within, or having effect within, the territory of the United
States, unless the contrary is clearly indicated by the statute." RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, §
38. See, for example, FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2) and FED. R. CluM. P. 17(e)(2), which permit
U.S. courts to subpoena a U.S. citizen or resident alien to appear as a witness, even though he
or she is abroad at the time of the summons; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
See also I.R.C. § 894 (revenue laws apply to U.S. citizens regardless of residence, except as
otherwise provided in the I.R.C. or by treaty); accord, Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 53-56 (1924).
37. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
38. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (using the protective principle of
jurisdiction).
39. Nevertheless, in the case of a wildlife species such as the whale, which migrates be-
tween the territorial seas of nations and depends upon ecological systems that extend beyond
U.S. boundaries, a court could conclude that to restrict the jurisdictional reach of a whale
protection statute to U.S. territorial limits would undermine the effectiveness of the statute.
From this, the court could infer congressional intent to include foreign territorial seas in the
locus of the statute. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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2. U.S. Enforcement of Treaty Protection of Wildife
The United States is a party to many of the bilateral and multilateral
- treaties4° that protect a wide range of species. 4 1 Like all U.S. treaties, wild-
life treaties may be either self-executing or non-self-executing. If a treaty is
self-executing, it "shall become effective as domestic law of the United
States at the time it becomes binding."4 2 A non-self-executing treaty re-
quires that Congress pass implementing legislation before the treaty's provi-
sions become binding. Without such implementing legislation, only a self-
executing treaty will supersede inconsistent provisions of earlier acts of
Congress or of the laws of the states. Determining whether a treaty is self-
executing is often difficult,4 3 and the courts have not made this determina-
tion for most wildlife conservation treaties. It appears that most of these
treaties are non-self-executing.
Regardless of whether a treaty is self-executing, it may be argued that
the courts should utilize statutes as aids in construing international agree-
ments. Certainly Congress may enact a statute that supersedes inconsistent
portions of an effective international agreement, provided Congress clearly
expresses an intent to supersede the agreement. 44 Nevertheless, whenever a
treaty and an act of Congress deal with the same subject, the courts will try
to construe them so as to give effect to both.45 Nor is it unusual for a do-
mestic court to rely on a treaty or other international agreement to which
the United States is a party as a tool for interpreting domestic laws, includ-
ing wildlife conservation statutes4 For example, in a federal-state conffict
40. See, eg., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, done Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249; Convention on Nature Pro-
tection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, done Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat.
1354, T.S. No. 981; Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, United
States-Great Britain, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628.
41. Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, done Nov. 15, 1973, - U.S.T.-,
T.I.A.S. No. 8409, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 13 (1974); Convention for the Pro-
tection of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, Mar. 4, 1972, United States-Japan, 25
U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990; Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, concluded Sept. 24,
1931, 49 Stat. 3079, T.S. No. 880, 155 L.N.T.S. 349.
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 141.
43. See generally N. LEECH, C. OLIvER &, J. SWEENEY, supra note 32, at 1024-31.
44. RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 145.
45. "An international agreement is binding in accordance with its terms and each party
has a duty to give them effect, except to the extent that they may be unlawful under the rule
stated in § 116." Id § 138. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933). See also MMPA,
supra note 5, § 1378(6)(B) (commits the Secretary of State to study what modifications, if any,
could harmonize the provisions of the MMPA with those of the Interim Convention on the
Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, done Feb. 9, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948,
314 U.N.T.S. 105).
46. One of the most widely cited treaties is the Migratory Bird Treaty, Aug. 16, 1916,
United States-Great Britain, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628, used in the interpretation of the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976). See e.g., Fund for Animals v.
Frizzell, 402 F. Supp. 35, 38-39 (D.D.C. 1975) (looking to Migratory Bird Treaty with Great
19791
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concerning jurisdiction over the seabed underlying U.S. territorial waters,47
the United States Supreme Court defined "inland waters" by reference to
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.4 8 The
Court relied on the Convention, although it went into effect after the enact-
ment of the statute in question,49 because the statute failed to define the
term. Likewise, the Eighth Circuit looked to the Migratory Bird Treaty50
for aid in defining "wild duck" as used in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,5 1
which Congress had passed to implement the Treaty.5 2 Courts have also
emphasized the range of materials and policies on which a judge may rely
when interpreting a statute.53 Thus it seems logical that courts should at
least consider a related treaty provision when attempting to determine
whether a wildlife protection statute should apply extraterritorially.
3. United States v. Mitchell
The only court squarely to address this issue, the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Mitchell,:54 refused to apply the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act of 197255 (MMPA) to a U.S. national who had taken dolphins in
Bahamian territorial waters. The court rested its decision on the traditional
rule for determining the extraterritorial effect of statutes: courts will apply
federal laws only within U.S. territory, absent a clear expression of contrary
congressional intent.5 6 After examining both the "nature" of the MMPA 57
Britain and to Canada's interpretation of the treaty for support of regulations providing stag-
gered hunting seasons across the United States); Bailey v. Holland, 126 F.2d 317, 322 (4th Cir.
1942) (upholding reasonableness of regulations issued pursuant in part to legislation not im-
plementing the Migratory Bird Treaty, because the regulations tended to effectuate the conser-
vation program envisioned by the Treaty); United States v. Lumpkin, 276 F. 580 (N.D. Ga.
1921) (including mourning dove as protected bird under Migratory Bird Treaty Act according
to list set forth in Migratory Bird Treaty).
Other examples of courts' use of treaties in statutory interpretation include United States v.
Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 199 (1975) (Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Re-
sources of the High Seas, art. 6, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285, used to bolster conclusion that enforcement of game and fish regulations in
Cook Inlet, Alaska, does not establish historic title to the inlet as inland waters); United States
v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11 (1969) (Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, used in defining
"bay" and "coastline" in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1976)).
47. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 161-67 (1965).
48. Done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
49. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1343 (1976).
50. Aug. 16, 1916, United States-Great Britain, 39 Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628.
51. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976).
52. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring) (inconsis-
tency of state law with U.N. Charter militates against validity of state law); United States v.
Vargas, 370 F. Supp. 908, 914 (D.P.1L 1974).
53. See note 34 supra; United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60 (1940).
54. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
55. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976).
56. Id. at 1002.
57. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
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and the statute's language and legislative history, the court held that there
was no indication that Congress had intended the MMPA to apply extrater-
ritorially.58
This analysis appears to be correct under traditional rules of interpre-
tation and in light of the content of the statute. Although the Act provides
for a moratorium on the taking of marine mammals that is couched in uni-
versal language, it does not specifically apply the ban to U.S. nationals fish-
ing outside the territorial limits of American waters.5 9 In addition, the
more specific prohibitions contained in the statute apply to actions on the
high seas, but they apparently do not extend to foreign territorial waters.60
Thus, neither the moratorium nor the specific prohibitions overcome the
traditional rule's presumption against extraterritoriality. 61 The legislative
history makes no definite statements favoring or opposing extraterritorial
application of the Act.62
58. 553 F.2d at 1003-05.
59. MMPA, supra note 5, §§ 1371-1372.
60. 553 F.2d at 1004.
61. See notes 35-37 supra.
62. Representative Burke, a supporter of the bill, favored extraterritorial application:
At the national level we have a similar problem, we can control what the States do, but
not other countries. By enacting this bill today we will have taken a giant step toward
management of marine mammals by controlling our citizens' actions that are detri-
mental to them, but we will still need international cooperation before effective man-
agement can be instituted. . . . []nternational cooperation is necessary to establish
effective management, and until this is achieved we must try to save these whales from
extinction by total protection from our citizens, and from those hunting in our waters.
118 CONG. REc. 7694-95 (1972). The House Report, however, contains a statement suggesting
that the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries did not intend that the MMPA be
applied extraterritorially.
In its deliberations, the Committee gave careful thought to the possibility of impos-
ing restrictions upon U.S. citizens and companies engaging in activities in foreign
countries which would not be permitted to them in the United States. This was done
as the result of suggestions made during the course of the hearings which indicated
that there might be significant U.S. investments in companies taking animals from
depleted or endangered species or stocks. Ultimately, the decision was made not to
include the authority to require the repatriation of funds used for this purpose, largely
on the basis that there was no solid information available on which a judgement might
be made. The matter does continue to be of considerable interest, however, and it is
the expectation of the Committee that the affected Departments of the government
and the Marine Mammal Commission will look into this question and will report back
on the need for legislation to plug what may or may not be a loophole in H.R. 10420.
H.R. REP. No. 92-707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4144, 4154.
For the legislative history of the MMPA, see 118 CONG. REc. 7698 (1972), reprintedin [1972]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4144; Coggins, Legal Protection for Marine Mammals: An
Overview of Innovative Resource Conservation Legislation, 6 ENv'T'L L. 1, 55 (1975); THE
EvoLuTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 1, at 324-69.
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II
A MODIFIED RULE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Because of the nascent state of international conservation law63 and
the apparent unwillingness of federal courts to use existing rules of statu-
tory interpretation to apply U.S. wildlife conservation laws extraterritori-
ally,64 a new rule of statutory interpretation is needed to reach acts harmful
to wildlife that are committed by American nationals outside U.S. territo-
rial limits. Hereafter referred to as the modified rule, such an approach
would use international treaties to which the United States is a signatory as
aids in interpreting federal wildlife conservation statutes. Adoption of this
modified rule would facilitate extraterritorial application of federal wildlife
laws by expanding the range of factors a court would consider when seek-
ing to establish the extraterritorial effect of such statutes.
The close relationship between wildlife conservation statutes and trea-
ties and international agreements for the protection of wildlife justifies the
use of such treaties in statutory interpretation. In general, the parties to
conservation treaties intend to protect wildlife from the harmful activities of
the nationals of the signatories 65 and, by signing the treaties, manifest their
adherence to international norms for the protection of wildlife. Because
courts should, as much as possible, harmonize congressional enactments
with the letter and spirit of treaties, 66 they should favor the extraterritorial
application of wildlife protection statutes. The modified rule would en-
courage courts to resolve ambiguities in favor of extraterritoriality,67
thereby harmonizing judicial interpretation with the goals of wildlife stat-
utes and treaties and international customary law on conservation. 68
63. See notes 14-22 supra and accompanying text.
64. See notes 40-62 supra and accompanying text.
65. See generally treaties cited in note 84 infra.
66. United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 1974).
67. The United States Supreme Court has developed a similar liberal policy for construing
the complex of treaties, statutes, and contracts that define the status of Indian tribes, which the
Court has termed wards of the nation that depend on its protection and good faith. Under the
policy, courts are to resolve legal ambiguities in favor of Indian interests, without disregarding
clear expressions of tribal and congressional intent. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425 (1975). See also United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Cutler, 37 F. Supp. 724 (D. Idaho 1941) (both cases holding that treaty preserved Indians' right
to hunt all kinds of birds at any time and in any manner, and United States could not restrict
Indians' hunting of birds upon the reservation).
68. See text accompanying notes 14-22 supra. It appears that courts may consider interna-
tional customary law to be part of domestic law. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677
(1900); Sprout, Theories as to the Appllcabllly of International Law in the Federal Courts of the
United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1932). Courts will attempt whenever possible to read
domestic law in harmony with international customary law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, §
3(3).
WILDLIFE STATUTES
A. EXPLANATION OF THE MODIFIED RULE
At present, federal courts usually examine only the language and legis-
lative history of a statute to determine whether Congress intended it to ap-
ply extraterritorially.6 9 Courts would use the modified rule only when these
factors revealed no clear intent regarding extraterritorial application of a
wildlife conservation statute. In such a situation, the extraterritoriality in-
quiry would focus on treaties and statutes dealing with the same wildlife
species, as well as international customary law on conservation. In using
these sources as interpretational guides, courts would have to determine
how much evidentiary weight to give them, just as courts do when they
interpret a statute by using statements from its legislative history.70
A weighing of the effect to be given to each interpretational source
should be based on the level of congressional consideration of and influence
on the approval of the treaty or statute, the wildlife species covered by the
treaty or statute, and the binding effect of the treaty or statute on U.S. na-
tionals. Thus, a statute would be highly influential because both houses of
Congress considered and passed it, whereas a treaty would be less persua-
sive because only the Senate had approved it, albeit by a two-thirds rather
than a simple majority. Similarly, a self-executing treaty would have con-
siderable impact because it, unlike a non-self-executing treaty, is binding on
U.S. nationals. Finally, a court should give more weight to a treaty or stat-
ute that deals with the same or a similar wildlife species as that covered by
the legislation in question. These factors can be ordered according to the
relative weight they should be given by a court as it considers treaties, stat-
utes, and international customary law to determine whether a particular
wildlife protection statute should be enforced extraterritorially.
(1) Language, legislative intent, and "nature of the law" 7 1 of the stat-
ute in question. At present, courts consider only these factors.
(2) The treaty implemented by the legislation that the court must in-
terpret. The court should give the treaty great weight because of its close
links to the implementing legislation, particularly because it deals with the
same species.7 2
69. See text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
70. See, e.g., note 62 supra and accompanying text.
71. See notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
72. Some examples of treaties and implementing legislation protecting the same wildlife
species are: the Fur Seal Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1187 (1976) and the Interim Conven-
tion on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, done Feb. 9, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No.
3948, 314 U.N.T.S. 105; the Migratory Bird Treaty Act amendments, Act of June 1, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-300, 88 Stat. 190, implementing treaties on new migratory bird species negotiated
and signed with Mexico and Japan, Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and
Game Mammals, Feb. 7, 1936, United States-Mexico, 50 Stat. 1311, T.S. No. 912; Convention
for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, Mar. 4, 1972, United States-
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(3) Statutes protecting similar species.7 3 Such statutes, which may in-
clude legislation implementing other treaties, should be influential because
they express the will of both houses of Congress and are binding on Ameri-
can nationals.
(4) Self-executing treaties protecting similar species.74 These treaties,
ratified by the Senate, would bind U.S. nationals without further action by
Congress.
(5) Non-self-executing treaties protecting some of the species covered
by the statute before the court.75 Although such treaties do not automati-
cally bind U.S. nationals, they evidence congressional intention through
Senate ratification.
(6) International customary law on conservation. Although interna-
tional customary law may have some effect in domestic courts, 76 it should
receive less weight than the other factors. The reasons are that it usually
applies to wildlife generally, rather than to specific species, 77 and that Con-
gress often has little influence on its content.
A court using the modified rule could examine one gr more of these
interpretational guides to find an expression of congressional intent that
would resolve the question of a statute's extraterritorial applicability. There
is, of course, no guarantee that any clear expression of congressional intent
would be found.78 But the overall import of these documents would proba-
Japan, 25 U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990. For a discussion of these treaties and the Act, see
THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW, suara note 1, at 68-92.
73. For example, the MMPA protects all marine mammals. This includes "any mammal
morphologically adapted to the marine environment, and includes animals of the orders ceta-
cea (whales, dolphins and porpoise), pinnipedia (seals, sea lions, and walrus), and sirenia
(manatees and dugongs), as well as sea otters and polar bears." R. Nafziger & J. Armstrong,
The Porpoise-Tuna Controversy: Management of Marine Resources After Committee for Hu-
mane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 7 ENVT'L L. 223, 224 n.9 (1977). Whales are also pro-
tected by the Whaling Convention Act of 1949, 16 U.S.C. § 916 (1976), and seals by the Fur
Seal Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1187 (1976).
74. Because self-executing wildlife protection treaties are few in number, courts will only
rarely be able to use them as guides to the interpretation of statutes. See United States v. Fuld
Store Co., 262 F. 836, 838 (D. Mont. 1920). See generalyi Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,
433 (1919); note 6 supra.
75. See, for example, treaties cited in note 84 infra, all of which are non-self-executing and
all of which protect one or more species included under the category of marine mammals,
Nafziger & Armstrong, note 73 supra. For a discussion of the binding effect of non-self-
executing treaties upon U.S. nationals, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, § 141(2)(a).
76. See, eg., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding U.N. Security
Council resolution, calling upon member states to have no dealings with South Africa that
would imply recognition of the legality of that country's occupation of Namibia, was not self-
executing and therefore not enforceable in a federal court absent implementing legislation).
77. See text accompanying notes 14-22 supra.
78. For example, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1976), has fairly
comprehensive prohibitions on the taking of migratory birds protected under treaties between
the United States and Great Britain, Mexico, and Japan. The language of the Act does not
specifically state that it has any extraterritorial application, nor does it specifically exclude such
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bly provide the court with a foundation on which to rest a determination
that the statute should or should not apply to American nationals acting
outside U.S. territory.
B. LIMITATIONS ON THE MODIFIED RULE
Since application of the modified rule would expand U.S. jurisdiction
over conduct that occurs outside American territory and is harmful to wild-
life, courts should restrict their use of the rule in several respects. They
should apply the rule only to defendants who are U.S. nationals and who
have violated an American wildlife statute in a foreign territory. This
would prevent aliens acting abroad from being held liable under U.S. laws
for conduct that is detrimental to protected species. This limitation is con-
sistent with the use of the nationality principle of jurisdiction as the basis
for the extraterritorial application of federal wildlife conservation stat-
utesY9
Courts should also refrain from applying the modified rule unless there
is little or no chance that the foreign nation in which the actions occurred
will prosecute the alleged perpetrator. The proliferation of multilateral
conventions protecting wildlife has increased the likelihood that foreign
states will have prescribed criminal penalties for actions that also violate
U.S. law. When this is the case, as a matter of international comity, the
foreign state should have the first opportunity to prosecute, since it would
be applying its own law to actions occurring within its territory. In addi-
tion, if the United States were to prosecute first, the defendant might face
later prosecution in the foreign state, creating a risk of double jeopardy.80
A final circumstance in which courts should not apply the modified
rule is when it would interfere significantly with a foreign state's develop-
ment of its natural resources.81 Thus, for example, the court should not
application. Id. § 703 (1976). Examination of related treaties reveals a congressional intent
that there be no extraterritorial application, and that each nation protect migratory birds from
takings that contravene the treaties within its own territorial boundaries. See Convention for
the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, United States-Great Britain, arts. VI-VII, 39
Stat. 1702, T.S. No. 628; Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mam-
mals, Feb. 7, 1936, United States-Mexico, art. II, 50 Stat. 1311, T.S. No. 912; Convention for
"te Protection of Migratory Birds and Their Environment, Mar. 4, 1972, United States-Japan,
arts. VI-VII, 25 U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990.
79. See notes 31 & 39 supra and accompanying text.
80. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (international
comity); AD Hoc CoMMITTE, supra note 32 (double jeopardy).
Furthermore, one of the main purposes of applying a federal wildlife conservation law ex-
traterritorially is to fill a gap between the conservation efforts of the foreign state and those the
U.S. Congress has indicated are desirable. When the foreign state is willing to prosecute the
defendant, assuming it has enforcement jurisdiction, there is no gap to be filled, and therefore
no need for the extraterritorial application of the federal wildlife conservation statute.
81. Each sovereign has the exclusive right to regulate the exploitation of natural resources
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apply the rule to hold the defendant liable under an American wildlife stat-
ute when the defendant's foreign operations provide substantial benefits to
the foreign state in which the alleged violation occurred. Yet this restriction
on the rule's applicability is not as absolute as the earlier limitations, since
Congress has shown a willingness in other areas of environmental law to
place conservation and ecological values above resource development in
foreign countries, thereby interfering with sovereign control over resource
development in those countries.82
III
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODIFIED RULE
A. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH To UNITED STATES il MITCHELL
By reversing the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Mitchell83 refused to hold an American national liable for viola-
tions of the MMPA that occurred in foreign territorial waters. Although
both the trial and appellate courts used the traditional rules of interpreta-
tion for extraterritoriality, they came to opposite conclusions. This indi-
cates that the MMPA is indeed ambiguous on the issue of its extraterritorial
applicability and that the courts might have profitably applied the modified
rule. Had the Fifth Circuit done so, it would have upheld the conviction by
the lower court. As before, the court would first have considered the lan-
guage, legislative history, and nature of the MMPA to determine the Act's
extraterritorial applicability. But since this analysis would not have re-
solved the ambiguity, the court, by applying the modified rule, would have
proceeded to consider treaties, statutes, and international customary law.
Seven treaties protect the same wildlife species as the MMPA.84 Five
within its territory. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952); Skiriotes v. Florida,
313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941).
82. Examples can be found in applications of the National Environmental Protection Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1974) [NEPA], the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATTJ,
openedforsignature Oct. 30, 1947, 67 Stat. Al 1 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 186, and
provisions of the MMPA itself. The Legal Advisory Committee of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality "has concluded that the NEPA requirements concerning impact statements
should apply to Department of State and AID actions carried out within the territorial juris-
diction of another nation, both as a matter of law, and as a matter of policy... ." Boxer, The
4merican Environmental Law SystenrA Modelfor Transnationa Action, I BROOKLYN J. INVL
L. 18, 36 (1975) (footnote omitted). Under GATT, the President may use economic sanctions
against a nation violating the provisions of an international fishery conservation program. 22
U.S.C. § 1978(a) (1976). If read literally, certain provisions of the MMPA would prohibit
importation of any product from a nation that failed to secure U.S. certification that its pro-
gram for the protection of marine mammals was consistent with the MMPA. Coggins, supra
note 62, at 55. "To some extent, Congress has opted in the MMPA for imposing American
standards of ethics and conservation practices on all other countries." Id. at 51.
83. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
84. Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, done Nov. 15, 1973, - U.S.T. -,
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of these would restrict the actions of U.S. nationals in foreign territories by
prohibiting the taking, import, or export of marine mammals.8 5 Further,
the implementing legislation for two of the treaties specifically calls for lim-
ited extraterritorial application.86 Thus, in a majority of the treaties that
would be considered under the modified rule, the Senate and the executive
branch-and in two cases, the House of Representatives-have shown a
desire to subject U.S. citizens acting abroad to restrictions similar to those
of the MMPA. The Mitchell court's refusal to give extraterritorial applica-
tion to the MMPA's protection of all marine mammals8 7 appears to be in-
consistent with an implied congressional intent to protect many types of
marine mammals from Americans acting abroad. To further this intent and
to promote the goals of international conservation law,88 a court using the
modified rule should resolve the MMPA's ambiguity in favor of extraterri-
torial application.
The court, having concluded that it could apply the MMPA extraterri-
torially, should next consider the policy question of whether such applica-
tion and enforcement would seriously interfere with the foreign state's
sovereignty over its natural resources.8 9 Although it may be difficult for the
court to determine the interest of the foreign nation in resource develop-
ment, in this instance it could look to the MMPA's permit mechanism. This
mechanism allows the Executive branch to waive the prohibitions of the
T.I.A.S. No. 8409, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 13 (1974); Convention on Interna-
tion Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, done Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T.
1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1085 (1973); Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17
U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Interim Convention on the Conservation of
North Pacific Fur Seals, done Feb. 9, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948,314 U.N.T.S. 105;
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, done Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716,
T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72; Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, concluded
Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, T.S. No. 880, 155 L.N.T.S. 349. For a short description of the
animals protected under the MMPA, see Gaines & Schmidt, Wildlife Population Management
Under the Marine MammalProtection Act of 1972, 6 ENviR. L. REP. (ENVIR. L. INST.) 50096
(1976); Nafziger & Armstrong, supra note 73.
85. Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, supra note 81, arts. I, V; Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17
U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285, art. 1; Interim Convention on the Conserva-
tion of North Pacific Fur Seals, done Feb. 9, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948, 314
U.N.T.S., arts. 1II, VII; International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, done Dec. 2,
1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, art. IX; Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling, concluded Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, T.S. No. 880, 155 L.N.T.S. 349, art. 9.
86. Fur Seal Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976); Whaling Treaty Act of 1950, 16 U.S.C.
§ 916c(a) (1976).
87. Nafziger & Armstrong, supra note 73.
88. See notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
89. The court in United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977), placed some
emphasis on this point, but used the argument only to refute the contention that the nature of
the MMPA necessitated its extraterritorial application. 553 F.2d at 1002; see note 81 supra.
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Act under certain circumstances. 90 If the Executive branch refused the
court's invitation to issue such a permit after the fact, the court could con-
clude that the conviction of the defendant would not impair resource devel-
opment in the foreign state, at least from the U.S. foreign policy viewpoint.
In any event, a case such as Mitchell appears to present little risk of interfer-
ence with such development.
B. POLICY EFFECTS OF THE MODIFIED RULE
Use of the modified rule would, first, lead to a better integration of
domestic laws, treaties, and international conservation efforts, thereby fur-
thering their purpose of protecting wildlife on an international scale. It
would help fill the gap between the limited protective effect of foreign na-
tions' wildlife conservation efforts and the measure of protection that Con-
gress has indicated is desirable. American citizens would no longer be able
to destroy endangered species abroad with impunity. Until treaties and es-
pecially their enforcement mechanisms prove equal to the task of providing
adequate protection for wildlife on a worldwide scale,9 1 extraterritorial ap-
plication could protect wildlife from exploitation by U.S. nationals.
Because the jurisdictional basis for the modified rule is the nationality
principle, this use of extraterritorial jurisdiction avoids questionable reli-
ance on "effects within the United States" as the foundation for jurisdic-
tion.92 Such reliance would probably be fatal to the extraterritorial
application of wildlife statutes because taking wildlife in a foreign territory
has only minimal adverse effects within the United States. 93 Finally, one of
the most important benefits of the modified rule is that it would provide
courts with a mode of analysis for determining the extraterritorial applica-
90. The Secretary of the Interior will issue a permit only after considering factors such as
the number and kind of animals involved, the location and manner of taking, and regulations
governing the granting of permits, and will promulgate regulations only after considering ex-
isting treaties, the marine ecosystem, and fishery resources. MMPA § 1374. See Nafziger &
Armstrong, supra note 73. See also Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 849-50 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (plaintiffs argument based partly on waiver of MMPA for American company harvest-
ing and importing seal furs from Namibia).
91. International law has proved a dismal failure in dealing with questions of such
common resources as marine mammals or fish.... International lawo has failed
because it provides no remedy short of war or economic sanction to bind intransigent
nations; that is, should any one nation refuse to go along with agreements or regula-
tions intended to benefit all nations by conserving the remaining marine mammal
resources, and 'world opinion' proves fruitless, and the non-conforming state refuses
to accept the jurisdiction or abide by the orders of the World Court, the only remain-
ing remedies are coercive and unilaterah warfare either by force or by economic
sanction.
Coggins, supra note 62, at 52.
92. See notes 23-25, 27-30, 39 supra and accompanying text.
93. Note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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bility of other legislation developed in a framework of international con-
cern, such as statutes dealing with pollution.
CONCLUSION
The protection of the world's wildlife is an important goal of U.S. pol-
icy and will continue to be the focus of considerable litigation. To increase
protection of'wildlife species, U.S. courts should apply a modified rule of
statutory interpretation when the question of extraterritorial application of
federal wildlife statutes arises. This would discourage American nationals
from violating these statutes in foreign territory. By considering the treaty
implemented by the legislation in question, statutes and treaties protecting
similar species, and international customary law on conservation, courts
can systematically promote policies favored by Congress and the world
community.
Daniel C. Brennan
